John William Waterhouse, 'Echo and Narcissus'. (1903) |
When I first read the title for Jacques
Lacan's essay 'The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function' my first imagining was of a
stage surrounded by mirrors, reflecting both the actor and the audience. What Lacan was referring to was actually a
stage in every human being's life, namely, at 6-18 months. But, I don't think my interpretation was that
far from the truth.
What occurs in the mirror stage
is a child's first fascination with their own reflection. Lacan writes of how the child, before he has
even yet mastered standing or walking, can already recognise his own
reflection. He leans into a mirror and
seeks to fix the image in his mind, to remember the face that everyone can see
but him. It is worth considering that
Lacan describes this stage in conjunction with a primal instinct towards
reproduction; he highlights a study on pigeons in which a female pigeon
recognises her own ability to reproduce by seeing the gonads of another
pigeon. (Lacan, p.5) interestingly,
Lacan also writes that "this condition is so utterly sufficient that the
same effect may be obtained by placing a mirrors reflective field near the
individual." (ibid.)
Is this the case in humans? Is our own narcissistic self-consciousness
actually intrinsic to our henceforth ability to reproduce? Regardless, what this asserts is that self
interest in this way is a primal instinct; it is natural to be fascinated by
who we are and what we portray of ourselves.
Furthermore, it harnesses an objective view of the world to look into a
mirror and understand that a movement has been willed by yourself, belongs to
yourself, and is not affiliated with that which surrounds your reflection. That
is to say, we define our physical presence by what is different and most
similar to what we can see and know of ourselves, beyond a piece of furniture,
an animal, or another human.
But, what of our psychical
presence? Taking this point further, we
turn to consider the space outside of our physical reflection. What I mean is the space beside geometric space, the "dark space of groping,
hallucination and music, which is the opposite of clear space, the framework of
objectivity" (Lacan, 2003).
Responding to the sound waves from a radio or, indeed, exhibiting the force
of our will to switch that radio on are barely tangible concepts to
ourselves. We cannot see emotions,
thoughts or dreams. I found it very
sobering to discover that the cerebral cortex in the brain, the part that plays
a key role in memory, perceptual awareness, consciousness, voluntary muscle
movement and reasoning, all crucial to recognising the reflection of ourselves,
is only 2-3mm thick. By looking at this
part of the brain, one does not thereby see the specific thoughts or emotions
of the human. Instead, our only witness
to the effects of this intangible space is that which we see in the mirror, in
our actions and most significantly, in other people.
To return to my mistaken reading
of the 'mirror stage' as a theatrical set, we can see that actually, the stage
is where these two planes of space - the tangible and intangible - are brought
together. An excellent example of this
is the layout of the Arcola Theatre in Dalston, London. I went to the theatre recently to see an
intriguing production from The Miniaturists (39) and an image that has stuck in
my memory is of the moment when the lights went down to begin the first
play. To set the scene, the auditorium
is designed so that the audience sits opposite each other, the stage space in
between them. Before the play has
started there is nowhere to look but at each other, and as the lights dimmed to
black out, I watched as a series of lights from people's mobile phones went
out. One by one, they took away the
illumination of a person's face. I
thought there was something quite apt about transferring light from the
audience member to the actor, but when the lights lifted again the opposite
audience was disconcertingly still clearly visible. What I was more comfortable with was that the
audience, particularly the front row where I was sat, is as much a part of the
stage as the set itself. I experienced
having a gun pointed in my face in one play and a bean bag placed next to me in
another and, although this does not serve to suspend belief, it certainly
welcomes the audience to the production.
By way of contrast to this somewhat collaborative approach to theatre,
we can consider the work of Martin Crimp.
Though brilliant, I find his plays to be wholly patronising by the way
it seems to scream through the fourth wall how ridiculous being human is. (I should add, the characters are generally
not screaming, the stark truth in what they say just makes it feel like
that.). The effect of this was that I
left 'In The Republic of Happiness' at the Royal Court last year feeling like I
should apologise for being so intolerable.
In particular were the lines:
"It's a fact I can eat fruit. It's a fact I can stand on one leg. Oh look at the fine fruit spray as I break
the peel.
Look at the fine fruit spray: smell this
fine orange. Look at me. I said look at me. Look at me eat fruit. Look at my mouth - not just the teeth - look
past the teeth, look right past my tongue - look into my throat - come right
into my throat and enter my stomach - enter my stomach, pass into my gut - look
round, yes, take a good look round my gut, check it out, check out my nice long
gut and emerge from my arse. Look at
me. Look at my arse." (Crimp, 2012)
This is where we return to the
notion of a mirrored stage, because it was like looking in a mirror that looks
back and balks at what it sees. The
Arcola stage however, by placing our fellow spectators in as much view as the
play itself, has a more surreptitious control over the audience's reaction. By way of explanation, I found myself to be
constantly checking that my face had not fallen gormless in immersion in the
play and, quite consciously, that I was laughing and frowning at the same parts
of the play as the opposite audience members.
That is to say, while the plays were mirrors of ourselves, we too were
mirrors of ourselves and the play's conversation seemed to involve everyone in
the auditorium. Either way, for both
Crimp's play and the Arcola Theatre, through the relationship between the
actors, the audience, the text and myself I was constantly aware of my own
reflection. The reason for this, I
think, is that what is necessary for responding to theatre is this same process
of defining - objectively - the differences and similarities we see in
accordance with ourselves. In short,
what is 'real' and 'true' to us. In
support of this we return to Lacan:
"The function of the mirror stage
thus turns out, in my view, to be a particular case of the function of imagos,
which is to establish a relationship between an organism and its reality" (Lacan,
p.6)
To conclude, whether it is a
piece reminiscent of, for example, Artaud's Theatre of Cruelty or Mike Leigh's
tendency towards social realism, when the lights dim on the audience the stage
becomes as much a narcissistic practice for the audience as a child pouring
into a mirror. It is a natural, primal
instinct and if Martin Crimp wants to laugh at us for it, so be it, because if
I remember the production rightly, we were all laughing too.
http://www.royalcourttheatre.com/whats-on/in-the-republic-of-happiness |
Crimp, M. (2012) In The Republic of Happiness. Faber,
London. p.67-8
Lacan, J. quoted in Caillois, R.,
Frank, C. and Walsh, C. (2003) The Edge
of Surrealism, A Roger Caillois Reader. Duke University Press, USA. p.90
Lacan, J. (2002) ‘The Mirror
Stage as Formative of the I Function’ in Ecrits A Selection. Translated by Bruce Fink. Norton, London.